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Abstract
The aim of this note is to suggest that prudence, i.e. convexity of marginal utility, can only
explain a small share of precautionary savings, which we may define as savings generated by
variance in income. Therefore, if we are willing to admit that precautionary savings
constitute a sizable share of total savings, other factors should be called for. We present a few
examples showing that risk aversion might constitute one such factor.
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The aim of this note is to suggest that prudence, i.e. convexity of marginal 
utility, can only explain a small share of precautionary savings, which we may 
define as savings generated by variance in income. Therefore, if we are 
willing to admit that precautionary savings constitute a sizable share of total 
savings, other factors should be called for. We present a few examples 





The extent of precautionary saving, as a percentage of total savings, has been the object 
of some theoretical and empirical research, ever since Leland (1968) showed the 
conditions required for variance in income to stimulate savings. 
 
Leland (1968) showed that an additional requirement was needed, over and above risk 
aversion, for savings to respond to increasing fluctuations of income around an expected 
future value, and this was convex marginal utility, or  0 ) (
' ' ' > w U .  
Kimball (1990) named this characteristic of utility functions “prudence”, and defined 
measures of absolute prudence and relative prudence as  ) ( / ) ( ) (
' ' ' ' ' w U w U w − = η  and, 
respectively, ) ( / ) ( ) (
' ' ' ' ' w U w wU w − = ρ , in a way which closely mimicked Pratt (1964) 
and Arrow (1965) definitions of absolute and relative risk aversion.   
Nevertheless, it seems fair to admit that no consensus has been reached as to the 
relevance of the precautionary motive for saving. 
 
Estimates of precautionary savings do not abound in the literature, and this is even more 
the case for estimates of prudence. Merrigan and Normandin (1996), Eisenhauer (2000), 
and Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) proposed some estimates of relative prudence, 
ranging from less than 1 to about 2 for a British sample, between 1.5 and 5.1 for an 
American sample, and somewhat higher values for an Italian sample. Considering that 
empirical values of relative prudence seem to be between 3 and 4, numerical 
simulations by Skinner (1988), Zeldes (1989), Caballero (1991), Deaton (1992), Carroll 
and Samwick (1998), and Irvine and Wang (2001) suggested that substantial amounts of 
precautionary saving might be obtained, ranging from 20 to 60 percent of all saving.   
 
Actual estimates of precautionary savings seem to be smaller, or at least no larger, than 
these estimates. Estimates of actual precautionary saving range from almost 
insignificant figures (as in the works by Skinner (1988), Kuehlwein (1991), Grossberg 
(1991), Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992), Starr-McCluer (1996), Parker (1999), 
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Kazarosian (1997), Alessi and Kapteyn (2001), and Hochguertel (2003)) to suggestions 
that precautionary savings might represent percentages from around 20% to 60% of 
total savings (as was the case in the contributions by Dardanoni (1991), Lusardi (1997), 
Eisenhauer and Ventura (2005)). 
 
The main aim of this paper is to show that prudence can only play a limited role in 
generating precautionary savings, i.e. savings related to increasing variance in income, 
and that other factors, such as risk aversion, should also be invoked. We show that this 
is true, in particular, when we allow saving in risky assets. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II sets the problem of prudence 
and precautionary saving in a very basic analytical set-up, to provide a simple 
discussion of the mechanisms at work. Section III discusses the empirical relevance of 
prudence in determining saving; section IV contains a few examples pointing at the role 
of risk aversion in generating precautionary savings, and section V concludes, 
suggesting avenues for further research. 
 
 
II. A closer look at prudence and precautionary savings 
 
To focus on the essential features of the issue, consider a very simple optimization 
problem in which an individual, endowed with utility function  ) (y U , consumes in two 
periods (date 0 and date 1), and faces uncertainty at date 1, in the form of a mean 
preserving spread ε ~ over two possible states of the world. This agent is endowed with 
income  y at date 0 and at date 1 (in expected terms). The two states of the world at date 
1 have equal probabilities (without loss of generality). We use a mean preserving spread 
for simplicity, as we do not want to change the expected income in the second period, 
which would then provide the agent with an additional, intertemporal, motivation to 
save. Also for simplicity, we suppose that the rate of time preference equals the rate of 
return on savings to eliminate impatience as an explanation of savings. 
 
Our agent is allowed to save at date 0, to transfer purchasing power from date 0 to date 
1. His problem will therefore be that of choosing s to maximize the expression: 
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In other words, the marginal utility of present consumption has to be equal, at the 
optimal solution, to the expected value of the marginal utility of future consumption. 
Now, if marginal utility is convex, it can be easily shown (see Figure 1 below) that 
randomness in future income raises expected marginal utility above its level at a certain 
income, and stimulates saving (all points on the chord represent a particular convex   3
combination of marginal utility evaluated at the two possible income levels, and thus 
represent expected marginal utility at date1).  
In fact, ceteris paribus, when marginal utility is convex, expected marginal utility of 
consumption is higher than marginal utility evaluated at the expected value of 
consumption in the absence of any saving. In other words, when income is affected by a 
mean preserving spread, saving must rise in order to preserve equality between marginal 
utility of today’s consumption and expected marginal utility of future consumption. 
Were marginal utility concave, the opposite would be true. 
 
The increase in saving will be larger the more convex is marginal utility (the larger is 
prudence, which can be taken as a measure of the gaussian curvature of marginal 
utility), and the more dispersed is income. Conversely, for very small risks or very small 
curvatures, saving will hardly depend on prudence. 
 
In passing, we may also notice that in the more general case where the number of states 
of nature (and corresponding income points) is larger than two, the expected marginal 
utility of income would always lie below the expected marginal utility of income 
obtained by concentrating all the probability on the two extreme outcomes. By 
restraining ourselves to the latter case, therefore, we adopt a very conservative stance 
(with respect to theory), i.e. one which is likely to overestimate the role of prudence in 
determining precautionary saving. 
 





















III. Is prudence really crucial in determining precautionary saving? 
 
In view of the previous considerations, an interesting question can immediately be 
asked: to what extent can convexity of marginal utility, or prudence, be considered 
responsible of “precautionary” saving, i.e. saving related to income uncertainty? This is 
largely an empirical question, and will be dealt with in an essentially empirical manner.   4
To this purpose, let us suppose the instantaneous utility function of our agent belongs to 










c u , 
 
where γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. It can be easily shown that for this 
family of utility functions the coefficient of relative prudence is positive, and equal to 
1 + γ . Notice, however, that any affine transformation of the proposed utility function 
would lead to exactly the same results, in terms of the results shown below. 
 
By using this instantaneous utility function the overall utility index, defined over 
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we obtain a saving function  ) , , ( γ σ y s  linking saving to initial endowments, random 
shocks, and relative prudence. 
 
In fact, rather than directly solving equation (3) in s, which may easily become very 
cumbersome (depending on the values of γ ), we will resort to numerical algorithms, to 
solve for s from the first order condition of problem (3), i.e.: 
 
γ γ γ σ σ
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To solve for s we will substitute data extracted from a few waves of the Bank of Italy 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) into (4). The SHIW is a survey 
conducted by the Research Department of the Bank of Italy every two years on a very 
large sample of families. The data is organized as a rotating panel, containing many 
interesting variables, both from socio-demographic and economic standpoints. In 
particular, we will use these data to compute a measure of income,  y , and a measure of 
income shocks, σ . 
 
Labour economists have long stressed the importance of linking income to various 
social and demographic factors, such as age, gender, education level, marital status, etc. 
We therefore develop a measure of unpredictable income risk, instead of simple income 
variance (or variance of income growth), as a proxy of income risk from such a model 
of income determination.  In other words, we define income risk as that residual of 
income variability that cannot be explained by socio-demographic factors. This has the   5
advantage that we define income risk as that variation that is difficult to explain with 
easily observed variables and so will be difficult, if not impossible, to insure against. 
 
Therefore, we pool together all observations of the Bank of Italy surveys from 1991 to 
2000, for which we have two consecutive observations on income, and estimate an 
income profile equation of the type: 
  
it it it it u X y y + + + = − γ β β
'
1 1 0                                                                                           (5) 
 
where  1 − it y  is income lagged one period, while the vector  it X  includes a set of other 
variables, such as age, gender, education, wealth and a host of dummy variables 
indicating the professional status, the sector and area of employment, etc. Standard 
assumptions are made on the disturbance term  it u . 
 
The underlying idea is that the systematic part of expression (5) can be predicted by 
households, so the residuals might be viewed as a measure of uncertainty. It seems 
likely that this will lead to an overstatement of income uncertainty, as our model will 
not capture much of the heterogeneity present in the riskiness of household incomes 
(which, again, is fine for the purposes of our analysis). In particular, it seems likely that 
households will have better information than is contained in our data so that some of the 
variance in  it u  will be known to the household.    
 
As a (rough) measure of income shocks ) (σ we chose to consider the mean (4070) and 
the median (2605) of the absolute value of estimation errors obtained from the income 
profile regression, on a yearly basis (the values obtained from the estimation have been 
divided by two, as the frequency of data is bi-annual). As a measure of  y  we take the 
overall average income in the second period, across all the individuals in the pool.  
 
The results obtained from the regression are reported in table A1, in the appendix. In 
table 1, below, we report the optimal values of s, computed from several specifications 
of the CRRA utility function (with γ  ranging from 1 to 10). The first and third rows in 
Table 1 contain the computation of saving according to equation (4), while the second 
and the forth rows contain the ratio of such measures to total savings (5793). 
 
This (rather wide) range for the parameterγ  was set on the basis of some previous 
empirical works providing estimates for the coefficient of relative risk aversion for 
Italian households. More specifically, both in the work by Guiso and Paiella (2001) and 
in Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) that coefficient is lower than 10. This is also in 








Table 1. Optimal savings induced by convexity of marginal utility, as a function of 
relative prudence and risk.   6
γ  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 
σ=2605 55.83  83.25  110.16  136.34  161.96 186.49  209.73 231.89  253.17  273.31 
%  savings  0.96  1.43 1.90 2.35 2.80 3.22 3.62  4.00 4.37  4.72 
σ=4070  135.67 200.75 262.82  321.24  375.72 425.82  471.78 513.62  551.58  585.97 
%  savings  2.34  3.46 4.54 5.54 6.48 7.35 8.14  8.86 9.52 10.11 
Note: Values have been computed on the basis of the following parameters: average yearly income = 
16384; average yearly total savings = 5793. All values are expressed in euros. 
 
Inspection of table 1 gives us an idea about the relative importance of prudence in 
determining precautionary savings. In particular, notice that even with rather large 
shocks, respectively equal to about 8% and 13% of average income, precautionary 
savings only amount to relatively small values, and that this is true even with fairly 
large amounts of prudence. 
 
On a percentage basis, precautionary savings would range between 1 and 5% of total 
savings in the case of the smaller shocks, and from about 2 to 10% of total savings, in 
case of larger shocks. 
 
In view of the estimates in the literature, referred to in section II, it seems likely that 
factors other than convexity of marginal utility should be called for to explain savings.  
 
IV. Could risk aversion also play a role? 
 
To address this issue, a few simple examples will suggest that risk aversion has an 
important role to play in determining precautionary saving. A common (and crucial) 
feature of all the examples is that agents can always save in risky assets, and possibly in 
a riskfree asset. Given that in real world economies virtually all assets are, at least to 
some extent, risky, this assumption does not seem particularly strong. 
 
The first two examples will cover the case in which prudence is zero, yet saving is 
positive and increasing in income variability in the second period. In the third example 
risk aversion and prudence will coexist, but we will propose a way to isolate the effect 




Consider an agent living in a two period economy, endowed with preferences 
represented by the utility function, defined over final consumption, 
2 20 ) ( bc c c U − = , with  0 > b  and such that marginal utility is positive. The 
agent has initial endowments of w at time 0 and of  k w λ +  and  k w λ − , 
respectively, in the two states of the second period (using the parameter λ , we 
can suitably modify the variance of future income), and who can save in a risky 
asset, y, with payoff  k r − = α  and  k r = β , respectively, in the two states of the 
world in the second period, α  and β , occurring with equal probabilities for 
simplicity. The price of y has been normalized to one (to avoid introducing an 
equilibrium model to determine the asset price – for example, we might say 
there exists a properly defined risk neutral individual, who forces the price of y 
to1). 
   7
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Setting  50 = w , and solving the resulting f.o.c. with respect to y, we obtain the 
following expression:  0.495 0.99 0.099 yb λ = +− . We easily observe that 
saving in y increases in income variance in the second period, and in the utility 
parameter  b 2 . 0 (< , to guarantee positive marginal utility), governing risk 
aversion. Clearly, in this example precautionary saving is positive as long as 
income variance in the second period is positive, and zero otherwise (or 





The economy is equal to that of Example 1, except for the fact that our agent is 
allowed to save in two assets: s, paying 1 in both states of the world, and y, 
paying off – k and k, respectively, in states α  and  . β   
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Setting  50 = w , and solving the resulting f.o.c.’s with respect to s and  y, we 
obtain the following expression for total saving  ) ( y s + : 
0.249 0.497 0.0497 sy b λ += + −  which is again increasing in income variance, 
and increasing in risk aversion. Once more, precautionary savings is positive 
whenever income variance in the second period is positive. 
 
 
These two examples have been worked out using a simple quadratic utility function,  
which has been criticized for the properties it implies in terms of risk attitudes. It is well 
known that quadratic risk aversion features increasing absolute risk aversion, which 
seems to be quite implausible, in the light of empirical and experimental evidence to the 
contrary. In the last example we will modify our economy to introduce more complex 
preferences. Prudence will no longer be zero, and this will bring in an additional 
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As in the last example, two assets are available in the economy, with the 
following payoff structure: asset s, pays off 1 in both states of the world, and y 
pays off – k and 0.8 k, respectively, in states α  and  . β  
 













 For  0 = r this utility function corresponds to well known 
preferences, of the CRRA type, for which the following relationship holds 
between the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ) (c R , and the coefficient of 
relative prudence, ) (c ρ :  γ ρ + = + = 1 ) ( 1 ) ( c R c . The parameter r can therefore 
be used to breach the linear relationship between risk aversion and prudence. In 
fact, it only affects the first derivative of the utility function, which enters the 
denominator of risk aversion coefficients, without affecting its second and third 
derivative, which leaves the coefficients of prudence unaffected. The only 
restriction that we place on r is that it be compatible with positive marginal 
utility.  
 
In this example we also constrain the investor to buy positive quantities of s and 
y (dissaving is not allowed).  Our agent has the option of saving in the two assets 
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where we have set  0 = r  for the first period and, for simplicity, the price of both 
assets has been normalized to 1. Differentiating with respect to s and y we get 
the first order conditions: 
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In view of the complexity of first order conditions for generic values of γ  we do 
not have closed form solutions, as in the previous examples, but report in Table 




Table 2   Total savings (s + y) for different values of λ  and r. Levels. 
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Notice that an increase in λ  will always generate an increase in overall savings 
and in its components (which is consistent with the idea that more income 
variability in the second period brings about more savings, both risky and 
riskless); more importantly, though, we can observe that an increase in risk 
aversion (higher r) will also increase overall savings, at least for certain ranges 
of  λ and r. As the latter goes up, saving in the riskless assets will go down, 
whereas saving in the risky asset will increase, with an ambiguous effect on 
overall savings. As risk aversion rises over a certain threshold, total savings will 
also rise, if no short sales of the riskless assets are allowed. We might describe 
the mechanism at work as follows: as the dispersion of income in the second 
period increases, the investor buys larger and larger quantities of the risky asset, 
to insure, and sells the riskless asset to offset the increase in marginal utility at 
date 0. The motivation to save, highlighted by Leland (1968) and hinging 
crucially on convexity of marginal utility, may therefore be partially or 
completely offset by the desire to insure. However, as r goes up, saving in the 
riskless asset hits its lower bound (i.e. 0), and there will be no trade off between 
saving in the two assets. Total saving will unambiguously increase, and this 
growth will be governed by risk aversion. 
  
 
V. Conclusions and avenues for future research 
 
In the previous paragraphs the role of prudence, i.e. a parameter measuring the 
curvature of marginal utility, was investigated in relation to saving induced by income 
risk. By a simple calibration of the first order condition for utility maximization with 
actual Italian data, it was shown that even in fairly extreme cases (i.e. rather large 
income shocks, and large values for relative risk aversion and prudence) the convexity 
of marginal utility might only account for relatively small percentages of total savings. 
This suggests, of course, that if one is willing to attribute a large percentage of savings 
to the riskiness of income, then other factors should also be invoked apart from 
prudence. One such factor is risk aversion, which drives individual efforts to hedge 
against unforeseen contingencies, thereby stimulating saving in state contingent (risky) 
assets. 
 
To stress this point, a few simple examples showed that, as the variance of income in 
the second period increases, an investor buys larger and larger quantities of an asset 
with risky returns, to obtain insurance, possibly selling a safe asset to offset the 
consequent increase in marginal utility at date 0. In this case, the role of prudence in 
determining saving may be overcome by the desire to insure. Nevertheless total saving, 
which one might correctly define “precautionary”, since it is originated by variance in 
income, turns out to be increasing in the latter, but might be governed by risk aversion, 
rather than prudence. Importantly, the first two examples show that even when prudence 
is zero, may we find precautionary savings, when both income risk and risk aversion are 
positive. 
λ        r  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
2  2.22 1.32 1.61 1.89 2.17 2.44 
3  3.33 2.45 2.72 2.99 3.26 3.52 
4  4.44 3.57 3.83 4.09 4.35 4.59 
5  5.55 4.70 4.95 5.19 5.44 5.67   10
 
The interplay between risk aversion and prudence seems therefore to constitute an 
interesting topic to explore in further work, both from a theoretical and an empirical 
point of view. In particular, from a more theoretical point of view it would be 
interesting to find out conditions under which the effect of risk aversion predominates 
over that of prudence, or vice versa; from a more empirical standpoint it could as well 
be interesting to analyze the behaviour of individuals affected by large (unpredictable) 
uncertainty, both in terms of amounts saved, and in terms of instruments used for 
saving. 
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This appendix contains the result of the estimation of an income profile equation, 
described in section (III). Data come from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth, pooling observations from 1991 to 2000. 
 
Table A1. Income profile estimation 
 
Variable  Coefficient P - Value
1 − t Y   0.43 0.00 
D91 -1486.23  0.00 
D93 -481.49  0.01 
DS -1281.69  0.00 
WEALTH 0.01  0.00 
EDUCATION 2022.31  0.00 
AGE 40.09  0.00 
DQ1 -1096.55  0.02 
DQ2 -1835.03  0.00 
DQ5 -1115.99  0.00 
DS1 1633.68  0.01 
DS2 3218.93  0.00 
DS3 2093.03  0.00 
DS4 2188.09  0.00 
DS5 4032.00  0.00 
DS6 8198.27  0.00 
DS7 5253.29  0.00 
DS8 3315.08  0.00 
UNEMPLOYMENT 409.37  0.00 
GENDER (f)  -1234.80  0.00 
R-squared 0.56   
 
Table A1 contains the results of an OLS estimation of equation (5). This equation yields 
income at time t ( t Y ) as a function of income (measured in € per year)  at time t – 1 and 
a set of other control variables, including age (in years), gender (1=female?), years of 
education, wealth (in euros) and a set of dummy variables indicating the professional 
status (DQ1, DQ2, and DQ5 denote, respectively: a blue collar worker, an office worker 
or school teacher, and others who are not employed, and the omitted category is junior 
managers and cadres), employment sector (indicating, respectively: agriculture, 
manufacturing, building and construction, wholesale and retail trade, transport and 
communication, credit and insurance, real estate and renting services, general 
government, and the omitted categories are domestic and other private services and 
extraterritorial organizations), and time dummies (D91 and D93 corresponding to 1991 
and 1993 observations, respectively, whereas dummies for 1995, 1998 and 2000 have 
been omitted). 
 
Variables are expressed in levels, as a log-level version of the same equation led to 
somewhat worse results. Variables with non significant coefficients have been removed 
from the estimated equation. 
 